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2. From E = K to R = K? 	One	might	think,	as	Williamson	himself	suggest	in	several	places,6	that	E	=	K	gives	some	support	to	R	=	K.	We	disagree.			E	=	K	entails	that	the	subjects	in	the	good	and	bad	case	have	different	evidence.	But	even	assuming	(as	we	are	willing	to	grant)	that	rationality	is	a	matter	of	conforming	one’s	beliefs	to	one’s	evidence,	that	gives	us	little	reason	to	suppose	that	rationality	requires	different	beliefs	in	the	good	and	the	bad	case.	The	claim	that	rationality	is	a	matter	of	conforming	one’s	belief	to	one’s	evidence	is	most	plausibly	interpreted	as	a	supervenience	thesis:	there	cannot	be	a	difference	in	what	rationality	requires	without	a	difference	in	one’s	evidence	(not	all	philosophers	will	agree	with	this	kind	of	evidentialism,	but	we	are	again	happy	to	accept	it	here).	That	leaves	it	open,	of	course,	whether	differing	bodies	of	evidence	can	rationally	require	the	same	belief.	Any	view	that	doesn’t	require	maximal	evidential	support	for	rational	belief	(such	as	our	own),	will	allow	that	one	subject	can	be	rational	in	believing	p	even	though	
																																																								5	Cohen	(1984)	presents	what	has	come	to	be	called	“the	new	evil	demon	problem”	for	reliabilism,	the	topic	of	this	volume,	one	of	whose	main	premises	is	that	victims	of	skeptical	scenarios	are	rational.	Comesaña	(2002)	responds	on	behalf	of	reliabilism,	but	agrees	with	Cohen	on	the	rationality	of	victims	of	skeptical	scenarios.	6	See,	for	instance,	Williamson	(2013b),	p.	92	and	Williamson	(this	volume).	Cf.	Cohen	and	Comesaña	(2013b),	p.	410.	
another	subject	has	better	evidence	for	p.7	If	I	believe	it	is	raining	on	the	basis	of	reliable	testimony	and	you	believe	it’s	raining	because	you	are	standing	in	the	rain,	I	can	rationally	believe	it	is	raining	even	though	you	have	better	evidence	than	I	do.	In	the	same	way,	the	evidence	in	the	bad	case	can	be	sufficient	for	rational	belief,	even	though	the	evidence	in	the	good	case	is	better.	Assuming	E	=	K	does	not	constrain	what	degree	of	evidential	support	is	required	for	a	belief	to	be	rational.	Of	course,	it	is	also	compatible	with	E	=	K	that	rationality	requires	different	beliefs	in	the	good	and	the	bad	case.		But	we	see	no	argument	in	the	passage	above	from	Williamson	that	this	is	so.		 It	may	be,	as	Williamson	suggests,	that	E=K	yields	the	result	that	one	should	have	a	higher	degree	of	confidence	in	the	good	case	than	in	the	bad	case.	This	would	follow	on	the	plausible	assumption	that	degrees	of	confidence	should	be	proportional	to	degrees	of	evidential	support.	We	take	this	result	as	reason	to	be	suspicious	of	E	=	K,	which	we	here	assume	only	for	the	sake	of	argument.8	But	even	if	we	grant	that	different	degrees	of	confidence	are	rationally	required	in	the	good	and	the	bad	case,	it	doesn’t	follow	that	different	beliefs	are	rationally	required.		
3. Justifications, excuses and R = K 	Williamson	distinguishes	between	justification	and	excuses	as	follows:	A	belief	is	justified	just	in	case	it	satisfies	the	relevant	norm.	For	concreteness,	let	us	adopt	a	norm	that	both	Williamson	and	we	would	accept	(although	we	would,	of	course,	differ	in	our	respective	accounts	of	when	certain	evidence	sufficiently	supports	p):		 (E):	If	your	total	evidence	E	sufficiently	supports	p,	then	(you	ought	to)	believe	p.				This	norm	of	justification	for	belief	gives	rise	to	a	secondary	norm:		 (DE):	You	ought	to	have	a	general	disposition	to	comply	with	E.		E	also	gives	rise	to	a	tertiary	norm:		 (ODE):	You	ought	to	do	what	someone	who	complied	with	DE	would	do	in	your	situation.		For	Williamson,	only	(E)is	genuinely	and	fully	normative	(with	respect	to	the	rationality	of	belief).	For	if	you	do	not	comply	with	(E),	then	your	belief	is	not	
justified	even	if	you	comply	with	both	(DE)	and	(ODE).	However,	complying	with																																																									7	We	are	assuming	here,	following	Williamson,	that	entailment	is	the	upper	bound	of	the	support	relation,	but	this	is	controversial.	The	notion	of	entailment	is	a	logical	one,	and	its	relationship	with	normative	notions	such	as	that	of	evidential	support	is	not	straightforward.	8	See	Silins	(2005).	




4. Unification or confusion? 	Williamson	proposes	that	his	view	has	an	advantage	over	ours	in	that	it	can	unify	what	he	calls	“objective	and	subjective”	norms	for	belief:		 [An]	advantage	of	the	present	framework	is	that	it	offers	the	prospect	of	unifying	‘objective’	and	‘subjective’	norms	for	belief.	As	most	epistemologists	
accept,	a	false	belief	is	somehow	defective.	In	particular,	the	brain	in	the	vat’s	false	beliefs	are	defective.	Their	defect	is	not	that	they	violate	a	norm	with	respect	to	which	the	good	and	bad	cases	are	equal,	for	the	subject’s	beliefs	in	the	good	case	are	by	hypothesis	not	defective.	If	the	brain	in	the	vat’s	false	beliefs	are	justified,	then	a	second	norm	is	needed	to	explain	why	their	falsity	is	a	defect.	By	contrast,	if	one	starts	with	a	truth-entailing	standard	J	for	justified	belief,	one	can	explain	directly	what	is	wrong	with	false	beliefs,	as	violations	of	that	norm,	while	still	having	the	resources	to	explain	a	corresponding	derivative	norm	ODJ,	which	the	subject’s	beliefs	comply	with	equally	in	the	good	and	bad	cases.		On	the	assumption	that	there	is	a	truth	norm	for	belief,	Williamson	claims	that	on	his	view	we	get	a	unified	account	of	the	normative	status	of	the	subjects	in	the	good	and	bad	case.	The	subject	in	the	good	case	satisfies	the	norm	for	rationality.	The	subject	in	the	bad	case	fails	to	satisfy	the	primary	norm	for	rationality,	but	instead	satisfies	the	derivative	ODE	norm.	So	Williamson	can,	with	his	single	truth-entailing	norm,	explain	both	why	false	beliefs	are	defective,	and	what’s	good	about	the	subject’s	beliefs	in	the	bad	case.	Our	non-truth-entailing	norm	explains	why	the	subject	is	rational	in	the	bad	case—he	is	believing	what	his	evidence	supports.	But	we	require	an	additional	norm	to	explain	what’s	defective	about	false	beliefs,	i.e.	what’s	good	about	the	good	case.		 But	a	unifying	account	of	distinct	phenomena	is	desirable	only	if	the	phenomena	are	related	in	the	right	way.	Consider	the	racist	belief	that	white	people	are	superior	to	people	of	other	races.	One	might	plausibly	think	this	belief	is	also	defective,	and	not	simply	because	it	is	false,	or	irrational.	As	Williamson	allows,	such	a	belief	is	morally	defective.	Should	we	expect	an	account	of	rational	belief	to	give	a	unifying	account	of	defective	in	the	bad	case	and	the	defect	in	the	case	of	the	racist?	Because	morality	is	a	distinct	normative	domain	from	rationality	(of	belief),	any	such	“unifying”	would	be	misguided.	Far	from	counting	in	favor	of	the	theory,	this	kind	of	unifying	would	count	against	it.	With	this	in	mind,	we	can	ask	whether	the	unification	yielded	by	Williamson’s	theory	counts	in	favor	of	the	theory	or	against	it.	It	will	count	in	favor	of	the	theory	only	if	falsity	is	a	rational	defect	in	a	belief.	But	this	is	(again)	just	the	point	at	issue	between	Williamson	and	us.	On	our	view,	rather	than	providing	a	unified	account	of	related	phenomena,	Williamson	has	misguidedly	conflated	distinct	normative	domains.	One	person’s	unification	is	another	person’s	confusion.		 Additionally,	there	is	reason	to	be	suspicious	of	Williamson’s	claim	that	there	is	a	truth	norm	for	believing.	It	is	uncontroversial	that	the	correctness	condition	for	believing	is	truth.	To	believe	falsely	is	to	believe	incorrectly.	Is	correctness	normative?	While	‘normative’	is	not	used	univocally	among	philosophers,	in	Williamson’s	sense,	“a	norm…	is	anything	that	can	yield	some	sort	of	‘ought’	or		‘should’”.	But	as	Judith	Thomson	(2008)	has	noted,	correctness	conditions	do	not	by	themselves	yield	‘ought’s	or	‘should’s.	There	is	a	correct	way	to	play	Mozart’s	piano	sonata	No	16.	Suppose	a	pianist	decides	to	play	this	sonata	incorrectly—she	leaves	out	or	adds	certain	notes	because	she	is	trying	to	achieve	a	certain	artistic	effect.	It	doesn’t	follow	that	there	is	any	sense	in	which	she	ought	not	to	or	should	not	play	
the	sonata	that	way.	Moreover,	this	is	not	just	because	the	reasons	derived	from	her	trying	to	achieve	the	artistic	effect	outweigh	the	reasons	derived	from	the	correctness	conditions—there	are	no	such	reasons.	Even	if	the	pianist	incorrectly	plays	the	sonata	without	a	reason	for	doing	so,	it	might	well	be	false	that	she	ought	to	have	played	it	correctly.	One	can	be	permitted	to	do	things	incorrectly.	Of	course,	there	may	be	other	considerations	that	militate	against	her	playing	the	sonata	incorrectly.	Perhaps	it	will	upset	or	offend	people.	But	in	that	case,	it	isn’t	the	mere	incorrectness	of	the	performance	that	generates	the	‘ought’.9	Analogously,	it	is	not	obvious	to	us	that	believing	incorrectly	is	normatively	significant.	When	one	has	very	strong,	but	misleading	evidence	for	p,	one	is	permitted	(indeed,	sometimes	required)	to	believe	p,	even	though	so	believing	is	incorrect.		
5. R = K and entailing evidence 	In	Cohen	and	Comesaña	(2013a)	we	noted	that	R	=	K	conflicts	with	the	truism	that	one	can	rationally	believe	a	false	proposition.	In	Williamson	(2013b),	Williamson	defends	his	view	by	appeal	to	E	=	K	and	the	surprising	claim	that	one	rationally	believes	p	only	if	one’s	evidence	fully	supports	(entails)	p:			 …since	truths	[E	=	K	requires	evidence	to	consist	only	of	truths]	never	entail	a	falsehood,	they	never	fully	support	a	falsehood	(support	in	the	strongest	way);	they	support	it,	if	at	all,	only	partially.	Rationally	sometimes	requires	one	to	adopt	a	false	belief	only	if	it	sometimes	requires	one	to	adopt	a	belief	not	fully	supported	by	one’s	evidence.	Cohen	and	Comesana	give	no	argument	that	rationality	ever	requires	that.		Nor	is	the	equation	E	=	K	the	only	view	of	evidence	to	yield	the	point	that	one’s	evidence	never	fully	supports	a	falsehood;	any	view	of	evidence	on	which	only	truths	are	evidence	has	the	same	consequence.	For	one’s	evidence	fully	to	support	a	falsehood,	the	evidence	must	contain	falsehoods,	in	which	case	some	truths	are	
inconsistent	with	one’s	evidence:	hardly	an	attractive	view.			In	Cohen	and	Comesaña	(2013b)	we	showed	that	these	remarks	commit	Williamson	to	the	view	that	one	is	not	rationally	permitted	to	believe	p	unless	one’s	evidence	entails	p.	Exactly	how	having	entailing	evidence	relates	to	believing	rationally	is	far	from	clear	on	Williamson’s	view.	The	standard	view	is	that	whether	one	believes	p	rationally	is	explained	by	how	well	one’s	evidence	supports	p.	This	explanation	hinges	on	the	role	the	basing	relation	plays	in	rational	belief.	The	thought	is	that,	for	familiar	reasons,	evidence	E	can	explain	why	one	rationally	believes	p	only	if	one																																																									9		Similarly,	we	would	argue	against	Williamson	and	others,	there	are	no	“ludic	oughts”—‘oughts’	generated	by	the	rules	of	a	game.	If	I	castle	while	in	check,	even	in	the	absence	of	reasons	for	doing	so,	it	might	well	be	false	that	I	ought	not	have	castled.	The	rules	of	chess	do	not	give	us	reasons	to	play	chess,	and	in	the	absence	of	a	reason	for	playing	chess	there	is	no	reason	to	refrain	from	castling	while	in	check.	
believes	p	on	the	basis	of	E.	Surely	Williamson	does	not	think	that	rationality	requires	that	when	p	is	inferentially	based	on	E,	E	must	entail	p.	It	reminds	one	of	Popper’s	“solution”	to	the	problem	of	induction,	which	amounts	to	saying	that	induction	never	yields	justified	beliefs.	We	can	perhaps	discover	what	Williamson	has	in	mind	by	seeing	how	R	=	K	satisfies	the	requirement.	Given	E	=	K,	the	entailing	evidence	requirement	follows	trivially	from	R	=	K.		If	one	rationally	believes	p,	then	one	knows	p.	If	one	knows	p,	then	one	has	p	as	evidence.	Since	p	entails	p,	whenever	one	is	rational,	one	has	entailing	evidence.	Construed	this	way,	the	entailing	evidence	requirement	offers	no	support	for	R	=	K	against	our	objection	that	it	conflicts	with	a	truism.	Williamson’s	point	is	that	the	entailing	evidence	requirement	rules	out	the	possibility	of	false	rational	belief.	But	we	already	knew	from	the	factivity	of	knowledge	that	R	=	K	rules	out	false	rational	belief.	If	the	entailing	evidence	requirement	is	simply	a	consequence	of	R	=	K,	then	Williamson	is	merely	pointing	out	(in	a	less	direct	way)	that	R	=	K	has	the	objectionable	consequence	we	already	knew	it	to	have.10			
6. Against R = K 		






6.2 R = K and practical rationality 	In	addition	to	beliefs	and	inferences,	actions	can	be	rational.	Suppose	that	both	Alan	and	Bernard	face	a	choice	that	is	p-dependent:	which	option	is	rational	depends	on	the	evidential	probability,	for	the	subject,	of	p.	The	choice	may,	of	course,	depends	on	more	things—for	instance,	on	the	subject’s	preferences.	But	a	prime	role	for	evidential	probability	is	to	encapsulate	the	subject’s	“epistemic	perspective”	on	a	choice.	Given	that	the	choice	for	Alan	and	Bernard	is	p-dependent,	and	given	that	their	evidential	probability	for	p	is	different,	it	will	of	course	be	possible	to	ascribe	to	them	a	preference	structure	such	that	taking	one	of	the	options	is	rational	for	Alan	but	not	for	Bernard.	But	suppose	Alan	and	Bernard	have	the	same	preferences	and	base	their	belief	that	p	on	the	same	evidence.		R	=	K	entails	that	a	p-dependent	choice	will	be	rational	for	one	of	them	but	not	the	other.	Williamson	will	probably	bite	the	bullet	here.	In	Williamson	(2005)	he	expresses	sympathy	for	the	following	principle:		(KPR+)	One	knows	p	iff	p	is	an	appropriate	premise	for	one’s	practical	reasoning.16		It	follows	from	KPR+	that	p	is	not	an	appropriate	premise	for	Bernard	to	use	in	practical	reasoning.	But	Bernard	is	just	as	rational	as	Alan	in	taking	p	as	an	appropriate	premise	in	practical	reasoning.	Williamson	would	have	it	that	this	claim	can	only	be	the	consequence	of	some	previous	allegiance	to	a	dubious	internalist	stance	in	epistemology,	fueled	by	a	failure	to	appreciate	the	consequences	of	content	externalism	in	the	philosophy	of	mind.	But,	if	anything,	it	is	the	other	way	around.	Judgments	about	rational	action	and	belief	are	where	the	rubber	meets	the	road	in	epistemology	and	the	theory	of	action.	We	take	it	as	a	datum	to	be	explained	that	Alan	and	Bernard	are	equally	rational	in	their	beliefs	and	actions.	That	datum	may	be	evidence	for	a	theory	of	rational	belief	and	action	that	is	internalist	in	some	sense	(although	we	suspect	that	the	terminology	of	“internalism”	and	“externalism”	is																																																									16		See	also	Hawthorne	and	Stanley	(2008)	
beginning	to	outlive	its	usefulness).	We	do	not	share	Williamson’s	optimism	about	philosophical	progress	enough	to	be	convinced	that	content	externalism	has	won	the	day	in	philosophy	of	mind	and	language,	but	(as	with	E	=	K	and	the	distinction	between	justification	and	excuses)	we	fail	to	see	an	incompatibility	between	it	and	the	claim	that	Bernard	is	rational	in	believing.	For	the	sake	of	content	externalism,	it	had	better	be	that	way.		
7. Conclusion 	We	have	argued	that	neither	E	=	K	nor	the	distinction	between	justification	and	excuses	provides	Williamson	with	a	good	argument	against	the	claim	that	being	rational	and	being	right	can	come	apart	from	each	other.	We	also	argued	against	Williamson’s	entailing	requirement	and	his	claim	that	his	view	provides	the	right	kind	of	unification	of	different	norms.	Finally,	we	also	argued	directly	against	Williamson’s	view:	it	has	unacceptable	consequences	for	inductive	inferential	justification	as	well	as	for	practical	rationality.		
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